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LIST OF PARTIES
The

only

party

on

appeal

proceeding in the Court whose order
Janet Higham, plaint iff/appellant.
the automobile insurer of
in

this

proceeding

who

was

is sought

a
to be

the

to the

reviewed is

Progressive Insurance Company,

the plaint iff/appellant,

because

party

Third

District

is respondent
Court's order

released to the insurer

funds

to

which

both

Janet

Higham and

Progressive Insurance Company claim a right.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction

of

the

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann.

Supreme

Court vests by virtue of

The proceedings below involved the

settlement of appellant's claims against two of the defendants and
the entry of default
suit.

judgment against

The settlements

in the underlying

were of claims based on the Utah Dramshop

Act and the judgment was based on the
motorist.

a third

Appellant's

automobile

portion of the settlement

funds.

negligence of

an uninsured

insurer asserted rights to a
The portion,

representing the

amounts the insurer paid appellant for personal injury protection,
uninsured motorist coverage, and collision coverage, was deposited
with

the

Court

in

filed a Motion to
The

Court,

which

the underlying suit lay.

Intervene and

after

receiving

a Motion
memoranda

The insurer

for Release
and

hearing

regarding the right of the insurer to intervene and the
the

appellant

or

her

insurer

denied the insurer's motion

of Funds.
argument
rights of

to the amount deposited with it,

to intervene

but granted

its motion

for release of funds.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are:
1.
motorist,

Whether an

personal

benefits for

injury

injuries and

automobile insurer which pays uninsured
protection,

and

collision

coverage

damages its insured incurs as a result
2

of

a

collision

subrogation or

with

an

uninsured

reimbursement to

litigating claims against the

motorist

funds its

uninsured

has

rights

of

insured receives from

motorist

or

whether no

such rights exist under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act;
2.

Whether, under

the provisions

of

appellant and

the

specific

No-Fault Insurance Act or

contract

of

insurance between

respondent, an insurer has rights of subrogation or

reimbursement to funds its
claims

the Utah

litigated

against

insured

receives

tort-feasors

from

other

settlement of
than

uninsured

motorists; and
3,
subrogation

Whether
if

an

equitable

insured's

principles

militate

against

recovery from tort-feasors has not

made her whole.
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY DEEMED
TO BE DETERMINATIVE
Statutes believed to be determinative of
issues

raised

are

Section

31A-22-302,

Section 31A-22-307, and Section

Section

31A-22-309, Utah

the respective
31A-22-305(3),
Code Ann.

The

statutes are set forth verbatim in the addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case,
from the order

of

in its status before this Court, is an appeal
the

Third

Judicial

District

Court granting

release to respondent of $35,082.00 of the funds appellant secured
through a settlement of
The

clubs

served

dramshop

alcohol

subsequently collided

with

claims

against

private clubs.

to an uninsured motorist, whose truck
appellant's
3

vehicle

and

caused her

severe physical

injury.

The case presents questions of law under

the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act and
principles.

The respondent

was not a party to the action below,

but filed a motion to intervene
portion

of

payments

appellant's

the

insurance

insurer

policy.

The

made
The

to

court
the

insurer

appellant's settlement

and a

settlement

release of funds but, at
intervene.

questions involving equitable

with

motion for

release of the

funds

which

was

equal

to

appellant

under

her automobile

granted the insurer's motion for

same

time,

denied

had

filed

its

the

dramshop

its

motions

motion to
after

defendants

the

and after

entry of judgment against the uninsured motorist defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
(R. 74-80) in

The appellant,

Janet Higham,

an

accident

automobile

uninsured motorist,

was severely injured

involving

an inebriated,

Jerome Patrick Scholtz (referred to hereafter

as "Scholtz"), in Park City, Utah, on March 3, 1983.

(R. 54, 151,

784, 836.)
2.

Appellant's

automobile

Insurance Company (referred to
appellant

$11,163.00

$20,000.00

for

in

collision coverage

under her

$20,000.00 sum,

sign the agreement.

injury

motorist

sought appellant's signature
covering the

hereafter as

personal

uninsured

insurer,

on

a

4

protection
and

(R. 872,783.)

release

but appellant

(R. 862, 873.)

"Progressive"), paid

coverage,

policy.

Progressive

and

benefits,

$3,919.00 of
Progressive

trust agreement

did not

agree to or

3.

Prior

to

the

accident

in

which

appellant

was

injured, Scholtz had been drinking alcoholic beverages at two Park
City private clubs, the Black Pearl and The Club.
4.

(R. 1-8.)

In December, 1983, the appellant filed suit against

Scholtz, The Black Pearl, and The Club.
5.

Progressive was

(R. 1-8.)

aware of

appellant's suit and her

allegations against all of the defendants from its inception.

(R.

872, 873.)
6.

At

various

negotiations, appellant's

times

during discovery and settlement

attorneys

communicated

to Progressive

the fact that appellant did not believe her insurer had any rights
under its policy or in law
might achieve.
7.

to be

subrogated to

(R. 886-889, 917, 919.)
Without

moving

to

intervene, Progressive filed a

Notice of Subrogation Interest in the amount of
29, 1985.

Appellant reached an agreement to settle her claims

against The Club on March 18,

Pearl.

$35,082.00 on May

(R. 957, 958.)
8.

1987,

any recovery she

agreed

to

a

1986, (R.

settlement

of

453) and,

in January of

her claims against The Black

(R. 692.)
9.

On January

26,

1987,

counsel

for

appellant and

counsel for Progressive stipulated to the deposit of the amount to
which Progressive claimed a right, $35,082.00, with the
the purpose

of achieving final resolution of the appellant's suit

against the clubs and to allow the Court to rule
claim.

Court for

(R. 711, 712.)
5

on Progressive's

10.

After approval of her settlements with The Club and

The Black Pearl, the appellant received
against Scholtz.

It was set for

a trial

setting for suit

March 17, 1987.

appellant presented

evidence of

Scholtz failed

to appear.

The

her damages and

received a

verdict and $139,716.76 judgment against Scholtz.

(R.

715. )
11.
trial

Counsel for Progressive was present in Court at the

of

appellant's

claims

against

object to

appellant's

evidence

of

Scholtz

and attempted to

damages.

The

trial court

refused to consider his objections, ruling that Progressive had no
standing in the matter.
12.

(R. 715.)

On July 8, 1987, appellant moved

she was entitled to the deposited funds.
13.

Progressive moved

and filed a Motion for Release

Appellant

of Funds,

filed

funds

and

The Court held

Progressive's

claiming entitlement to

(R. 866-870.)
memoranda

Progressive's motions on July 29, 1987.
15.

(R. 783-784.)

to intervene in appellant's suit

the $35,082.00, on July 23, 1987.
14.

for judgment that

a

hearing

motion

in

opposition

to

(R. 897-962.)
on

the

claims

to the

to intervene on August 3, 1987,

and on November 5, 1987, ruled that appellant's motion for summary
judgment be denied, Progressive's motion for leave to intervene be
denied, and Progressive's motion for release of funds
(R. 972.)

6

be granted.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The

following

is

a

succinct

condensation

of

the

arguments actually made in the body of this brief:
Argument, Point I;
the deposited

The Court below erred in releasing

funds to Progressive because a no-fault insurer has

no right of subrogation or right to reimbursement
insured

under

the

rights, if any, to
appellant are
insured.

Utah

No-Fault

recoup

against its own

Insurance Act.

uninsured

motorist

Progressive's

benefits

paid to

against the uninsured motorist tort-feasor, not the

The

insurer

has

no

subrogation

right

or

right of

reimbursement for personal injury protection benefits or collision
coverage because the coverage
insured and

is secured

by premium

paid by the

the insurer would receive double recovery through the

exercise of such a right.
Argument, Point II:
the funds
the

in question

provisions

insurer

give

reimbursement of

of
the

The Court below erred in releasing

to Progressive because neither the law nor

the

specific

insurer

monies an

the

contract
right

to

insured motorist

between

insured and

subrogation

or

to

receives from tort-

feasors other than an uninsured motorist tort-feasor.
Argument, Point III:

The Court below erred in releasing

the funds in question to Progressive

because it

is not equitable

to allow an insurer to recover monies paid under its contract from
an insured whose recovery

through

whole.

7

litigation

has

not

made her

POINT I
UNDER
UTAH
LAW, AN AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE CARRIER DOES NOT HAVE RIGHTS OF
SUBROGATION OR REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE, PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION,
OR COLLISION COVERAGE BENEFITS PAID TO ITS OWN
INSURED FOR DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN
ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY UNINSURED MOTORISTS.
The

components

required

in

motor

policies in Utah are now set forth in the motor

vehicle

insurance

vehicle insurance

chapter of the Insurance Code, Section 31A-22-302, Utah Code Ann.,
which provides:
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination
of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's
or operator's security requirement of Section
41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor
vehicle liability coverage
under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-302;
and
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under
Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively
waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination
of policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's
or operator's security requirement of Section
41-12a-3Gl, except for motorcycles, trailers,
and semitrailers, shall also include personal
injury protection under Sections 31A-22-306
through 31A-22-309.
(3) First party medical coverages may be
offered or included in policies issued to
motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or
operators. These owners and operators are not
covered
by
personal
injury
protection
coverages in connection with injuries incurred
while operating any of these vehicles.

8

A.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

The uninsured motorist coverage required by Section 31A22-302(l)(b) is described in Section 31A-22-305(3):
(3) Uninsured
motorist
coverage
under
Subsection 31A-22-3Q2(1)(b) provides coverage
for covered persons who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death, in limits
which at least equal the minimum bodily injury
limits for motor vehicle liability policies
under Section 31A-22-304.
The essence of
codified

in

Sections
Section

amendment (and

31A-22-302(1)(b)

41-12-21.1

renumbering) of

and

31A-22-305(3) was

prior to the legislature's 1986
the Insurance

Code.

In Lima v.

Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982), this Court stated,
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Section 41-12-21.1
requires that automobile liability insurance
policies include coverage for accidents with
uninsured motorists:
[N]o
automobile
liability
insurance
policy insuring against loss resulting
from liability imposed by law for bodily
injury
or
death or property damage
suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle, shall be delivered . . . unless
coverage is provided in such policy . . .
for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators
of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-andrun motor vehicles of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death,
resulting therefrom.
[Emphasis added.]
657 P.2d at 280.
automobile

In Lima, the question considered

liability

insurance

carrier

was whether an

providing

uninsured

motorist coverage might intervene as of right as a party defendant
in a

tort action

between its

insured and
9

an uninsured motorist

tort-feasor.

Ld.

Lima

Chambers, filed

a

negligence

discovery

her

in

withdrawal from

had

been injured in a collision with
action

action.

the case,

against

Following

Lima's attorney

him,

and pursued

Chambers'

attorney's

prepared an affidavit

for Chambers' signature which acknowledged the facts that Chambers
was an uninsured motorist
Lima was

injured.

in

the

remaining issue

should be

and her
action

collision in which

This

allowed to

uninsured motorist
for

of Lima's

carrier's motion.

caused the

Lima obtained summary judgment on the issue of

Chambers' liability
intervene

and had

the

purpose

damages.

carrier moved to

of

The trial

litigating

the

court denied the

Court reversed, holding that the carrier

intervene under

Rule 2 4 ( a ) ,

Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure,
[bjecause Section 41-12-21.1 requires insurers
to
assume
financial
responsibility
for
judgments
obtained
by their insureds against
uninsured motorist tortfeasors (within certain
limits),
and
because
of
the
insurer's
contractual
obligation
which
embodies
that
statutory requirement,
the insurer "is or may
be bound" by
the
tort
judgment
within the
meaning of Rule 24.
657 P.2d at 284 (citations
In

reaching

omitted.)

its

holding,

insurance carrier as "contractually
an

uninsured

motorist"

citation of the statutory
insurance policies

(657

Court

liable for

P.2d

requirement

include coverage

the

a judgment

at 2 8 0 ) .
that

described

against

Directly below its

automobile

liability

for accidents with uninsured

motorists, the Court stated:
Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured
motorist, the insured may recover damages from
10

the

his own insurance company upon showing that he
is "legally entitled" to recover those damages
from the uninsured tortfeasor.
This showing
of legal entitlement typically
entails a
lawsuit against the uninsured tortfeasor to
litigate the issues of liability and damages.
A judgment favorable to the insured fixes the
insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that
judgment, within the policy limits.
The
insurer is then left to pursue its subrogation
remedy against the uninsured tortfeasor.
657 P.2d at 281 (emphasis added.)
Lima's case
ways.

First,

differed factually

Lima's

carrier

from appellant's in two

apparently

did

not

pay

her the

uninsured motorist limits of her policy before she established her
legal entitlement to recover
policy limits
Second, Lima's
while it

to appellant
carrier

damages, while
upon receipt

attempted

to

Progressive paid the

of her

intervene

settlements occurred

was rendered.

dispositive of

motorist
when

the

motorist.

in

her lawsuit

was pending, while Progressive did not seek to intervene

in appellant's lawsuit until

automobile

claim for them.

But

Lima is

liability
coverage
insured

insurance

has

a

carrier

a

judgment.

providing

judgment

carrier is

uninsured

against

an

uninsured

contractually liable to the

insured, up to the limits of the uninsured
the insured's

the issue whether an

subrogation remedy against its insured

receives

The insurance

and a judgment

motorist coverage, for

The carrier must pursue the subrogation

remedy against the uninsured tort-feasor.
Thamert v. Continental
1980), is

Cas.

Co.,

621

P.2d

to the same effect as Lima v. Chambers, supra.

was injured in a

collision with
11

an uninsured

motorist.

702 (Utah
Thamert
At the

time of

the collision, he was in the course of his employment and

therefore

received

employer's

workers'

workers'

compensation

compensation

benefits

carrier.

compensation carrier was also the employer's

from

The

workers'

casualty carrier and

the casualty policy included uninsured motorist coverage.
had his own automobile

policy which

coverage.

judgment

Following

his

Thamert

contained uninsured motorist

by default against the uninsured

motorist, Thamert filed an action in which he sought the uninsured
motorist benefits

from his

his own automobile
judgment to

carrier.

both insurance

employer's casualty
The

trial

carriers and

carrier and from

court

granted summary

Thamert appealed.

carriers defended their judgments on the ground, inter
any

recovery

under

their

uninsured

motorist

reduced by amounts paid or payable as workers'
Court held
Thamert's

that the
workers'

determination of
insurance

was

resulted in

insurers should
compensation

problems of
excess,

and

not be

benefits,

Both

alia, that

coverage must be
compensation.

The

permitted to offset
but

remanded

for

fact, the problem of whether either
the

question

overexposure to either insurer.

whether

its decision

In its decision, the

Court spoke of the intent behind the uninsured motorist statute as
follows:
We are of the opinion that it was the intent
of the legislature in adopting Section 41-1421.1 that an insured, who availed himself of
uninsured
motorist
coverage
would
have
pro tect ion in no t less than $15,000 per person
and $30 ,000 P«er occurrence.
Any attempt to
rediuce the amoun ts specifie d would be contrary
to the statute.

12

621 P.2d at 704 (emphasis added.)
light

of

the

fact

that

This

both

of

language is

critical in

the insurance policies under

consideration contained provisions which reduced the policy limits
by

any

amount

the

compensation laws.

insured

should

receive

under

workers'

Of this fact, the Court stated,

In considering the respective positions of the
parties we start from the premise that if we
are governed by the clear provisions of the
policies here involved, the plaintiff cannot
recover. However, the plaintiff contends that
an insurer cannot by contract, reduce the
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage required
A majority of the courts . . . have adopted
the view that permitting offsets by contract
would allow insurers to escape all or a part
of the liability the legislature mandated they
should provide.
Id. (emphasis added.)
The reasoning,
that

the

purpose

Sections 31A-22-302

and holdings, in Lima and Thamert reveal

and

intent

motorist

this case.
coverage

Progressive,

the

legislature

The

and

choosing

against

to

just

such

appellant chose

coverage

in

the

a

contingency as

to carry uninsured

paid

premiums

write

automobile insurance in Utah in

exchange for perceived profit, accepted her
the

in enacting

and 31A-22-3Q5(3) were to allow a responsible

motorist to insure herself
occurred in

of

amount

and

kind

for

the

coverage.

premiums and extended
set forth by law.

appellant was severely injured by a motorist who did not

When

take the

responsibility of carrying insurance, she was entitled to the full
uninsured motorist
that

she

was

coverage of

legally

her own

entitled
13

to

policy upon establishing

recover

damages

from

the

uninsured motorist.

Respondent

appellant's action

against the

policy limits or contest
also has,

had

a

right

to

intervene in

uninsured motorist to protect its

its insured's

entitlement.

Progressive

now, a right to pursue a subrogation remedy against the

uninsured tort-feasor.
subrogation against

Progressive

its own

has

no

right,

however, to

insured and no right to receive back

from her that which it was its contractual duty to pay.
court erred

in releasing

The trial

$20,000.00 of appellant's settlement to

the respondent.
B.

Personal Injury Protection

Section
insurance
security

31A-22-302(2)

purchased
under

protection."

to

the

satisfy

law

Personal

all expenses

an

"shall

that

every

policy

of

automobile owner's proof of

also

include

personal

injury

injury protection coverages and benefits

are set forth in Section
value of

states

31A-22-307

and

include

the reasonable

for medical, surgical, x-ray, hospital and

nursing services.
After

appellant's

accident

paid $11,163.00

in personal

injury protection

her under the terms of her

policy.

with

Scholtz, Progressive
(PIP) benefits to

Appellant's medical expenses

as a result of the accident were $70,716.76 (R. 774) as of June of
1987 and, given the

nature of

have continued to accrue.
This

Court

her injuries

and disability, they

(R. 722-770.)

discussed

PIP

benefits

fault" auto insurance law in Allstate Ins. Co.
1197 (Utah 1980):
14

under Utah's "nov. Ivie,

606 P. 2d

The true "no-fault" insurance is a type
of compensation system which
couples the
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis with
the partial elimination of fault-based tort
actions for both economic losses and pain and
suffering. This system generally continues to
permit
fault-based
claims
for pain and
suffering in the more serious cases and for
economic losses above no-fault benefits. A
system wh ich has no tort exemption at all is
not a "no -fault" insurance. The Utah no-fault
statu te
is
a
compulsory,
partial tort
exemption law
coupling no-fault
insurance
partial
benefits,
Section
with
A*.
elimination of tort claims for bodily injury.

Un der this statut ory Pi an, first par ty PIP
benefi.ts up to the amounts provided in S ect ion
6 are paid to an in jure d p erson with out regard
to fault. Furthermore, the injured party is
precluded
from
maintaining an action to
recovery general damages (all damages other
than those
awarded for economic losses),
except where the threshold requirements of
Section 9(1) are met.
Under Section 9(2),
there are two consequences to the owner of a
motor vehicle who fails to have the security
required by Section 5; first, he has no
immunity from tort liability; second, he is
personally liable for the benefits provided
under Section 6
The o nly logical inference
is that if a party has the security required
under Section 5, the n o-fault insurance act
confers two privileges: first, he is granted
partial tort immunity; second, he is not
personally liable for t he benefits provided
under Section 6.
He does, however, remain
liable for customary
tort
claims, viz.,
general
damages
and economic losses not
compensated by the benefi ts paid under Section
6, where the threshold provisions of Section
9(1) are met.
606 P.2d at 119,
scheme, an

1200

(emphasis

Under

the statutory

insured tort-feasor is not liable for PIP benefits his

victim receives from her insurer.
PIP benefits

added.)

as damages

in an

The victim
action against

15

cannot include the
the insured tort-

feasor.

In case of settlement

and the

victim, the

between the

amount of

PIP benefits

from her own insurer are not included.
then, is

subject to

The Ivie Court

tort-feasor 's insurer
the victim

received

The tort-feasor's

insurer,

the victim's insurer's claim of subrogation.

explained,

Under the Utah No-Fault
Insurance
Act, the
tort-feaso r who
has the required security, is
not person ally liable
to
the
injured person
for
payme nt
of Section
6 benefits, Section
9(2);
the refore,
the
tort-feasor
has
no
personal
legal
obligation
to reimburse the
injured party's insurer.
On the
other hand.
tort-feasor's
liability
insurer,
in
the
fulfilling its duty to respond to
the claims
of the
injured
party
to
the limits of its
policy, stands in the shoes of its insured and
pays
on
the basis of its insured's personal
liability to the
tort
victim;
this personal
liability
does
not
include
PIP
payments.
Thus,
the
tort
victim's
recovery
from the
liability insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP
payments.
If the victim's recovery be reduced
by the amount of the PIP payments by granting
his no-fault
insurer a right of subrogation,
it is the no-fault insurer who receives double
This
is so because
the insurer
recovery,
receives a premium for the benefits, and then
while
the
full
reimbursement
receives
liability
insurance
available
to recompense
the victim is depleted
by payments
for which
the
liability
insurer
is not responsible to
the victim.

However, [the PIP
insurer]
is not precluded
from
claiming
reimbursement
from ("the tortfeasor' s
insurer]
in
an
arbitration
proceeding.
606 P.2d at 1202, 1203 (emphasis
At

the

time

of

the

added.)
Ivie

appellant's accident, Section 31-41-11,
effect.

It read,
16

decision
Utah

and

Code

the time of
Ann.,

was in

(1) Every insurer authorized to write
the insurance required by this act shall agree
as a condition to being allowed to continue to
write insurance in the State of Utah;
(a) That where its insured is
or would be legally liab le for the
personal injuries sustain ed by any
person to whom benefits required
under this act have bee n paid by
another insurer, including the state
insurance fund, it will reimburse
such other insurer for t he payment
of such benefits, but not in excess
of
the
amount
of
d amages so
recoverable, and
(b) That
the
issue
of
liability for such reimbursement and
the amount of same shall be decided
by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers.
Section 31-41-11
Code Ann,

is now

embodied in

Section 31A-22-309(6), Utah

which reads
(6) Every
policy
providing personal
injury protection coverage shall provide:
(a) that where
the insured
under the policy is o r would be held
legally liable
for the personal
injuries sustained b y any person to
whom
benefits
r equired
under
personal injury prote ction have been
paid by another ins urer, including
the Workers' Compen sation Fund of
Utah, the insurer of the person who
would be held legal ly liable shall
reimburse the other i nsurer for the
payment, but not i n excess of the
amount of damages rec overable; and
(b) that
the
issue
of
liability for that reimbursement and
its amount shall be
decided by
mandatory,
binding
arbitration
between the insurers.

17

The content of the statutes is the same.

Of Section 31-41-11, the

Ivie Court wrote,
Section 11 in the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act
cannot be interpreted as conferring on the nofault insurer a right of subrogation to the
funds received by its insured for personal
injuries.
Section 11 grants the no-fault
insurer a limited, equitable right to seek
reimbursement
in
arbitration
proceeding
against the liability insurer.
Section 11
cannot be deemed as conferring subrogation
rights on the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its
insured as to his recovery in a settlement or
legal action.
606 P.2d

at 1202 (emphasis added.)

In the context of Ivie, where

the tort-feasor is insured and his insurance provides the proceeds
of

settlement

with

the

reimbursement for PIP
Where,

as

here,

victim,

benefits

the

the victim's insurer must seek

from

tort-feasor

the
is

tort-feasor's insurer.

not

insured, but remains

personally liable for the benefits paid by the victim's insurer as
well

as

for

the

victim's insurer

claims
must

not

seek

compensated by such benefits, the

reimbursement

from

the tort-feasor

himself.
The

appellant

has

settled claims against tort-feasors

other than the uninsured motorist.

This fact

the No-Fault

to make

Insurance Act

subrogation rights
Progressive

may

so as

against their
not

have

does not

it confer on insurers

own insureds

the

limited

alter the

for PIP benefits.

equitable right to seek

reimbursement in an arbitration

proceeding

tortfeasor's

reduce appellant's recovery would

insurer,

cause the result the

but

to

court rejected

against

in Ivie:

Progressive would

receive both its premium for the benefits and full
18

the motorist

reimbursement, while the recovery available to the victim would be
depleted by payments
responsible.

for

which

the

uninsured

motorist remains

The trial court erred in releasing to respondent the

$11,163.00 of appellant's settlement.
C.

Collision Coverage

Collision coverage, like uninsured motorist coverage, is
secured

and

paid

for

against

the

possibility

uninsured motorist.
appellant that for

by

the responsible driver to protect her
of

collision

with

an

irresponsible

Respondent has no right to receive back from
which

she

paid

unless

she

has

received a

double-recovery.

As noted above, and will be explained more fully

below, appellant

has not

The trial

received double-recovery

in this case.

court erred in releasing to respondent the $3,919.00 of

appellant's settlement.
POINT II
AN INSURER HAS NO RIGHT TO RECOVER FROM
SETTLEMENT FUNDS COVERAGE PROVIDED AN INSURED
WHEN ITS POLICY IS UNCLEAR AND THE SETTLEMENT
FROM WHICH IT SEEKS RECOMPENSE HAS NO RELATION
TO THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THE POLICY.
A.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

Progressive's policy states,
Coverage I — Uninsured Motorists Coverage
We will pay damages for bodily injury which an
insured person is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as
defined in this part. The bodily injury must
be caused by accident and arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or driving
of the
uninsured
motor
vehicle.
Determination
whether an insured person is legally entitled
19

to recover
damages
or the amount of damages
shall be made by agreement between the insured
person and
us.
If no agreement is reached,
the
decision
will
be made by arbitration.
Such arbitration
must be
demanded within one
year after the date of the accident.
If suit
is brought
to determine
legal liability or
damages without our written
consent, we are
not bound by any resulting judgment.
Progressive Companies'
5 2 6 ) , Part IV, p.
Progressive paid

4

of

an

(R.

524)

to

recover"

uninsured

Policy Agreement

(emphasis

appellant under

is "legally entitled
operator

Combination Car

motor

private clubs

The damages

this policy are those which she
from

Scholtz,

vehicle."

court released to Progressive were monies
the defendant

added.)

(R. 520-

the

"owner or

The funds the trial

appellant

received

in settlement of statutory

from

liability

imposed on the clubs by the Utah Dramshop Act.
On page 5 of respondent's policy

(R. 5 2 5 ) , the following

exclusion to coverage appears:
Exclusions
This coverage
does not apply to bodily
sustained by a person

injury

2.
If
that
person
or
the
legal
representative
of
that
person
makes
a
settlement without our written consent
Page 5 also contains the following "Trust Agreement":
Trust Agreement
If we pay for a loss under this coverage:
1.
We are entitled to
recover from you
an amount
equal to such payment if
there is a legal
settlement made on
your behalf
against
the person or
organization legally responsible for
the bodily injury.
2.
You must
hold
in trust for us all
rights to recover
money
which you
20

have
against
the
person
or
organization legally responsible for
bodily injuryYou must
do everything
proper to
secure our rights and
do nothing to
prejudice these rights.
If we
ask you
in writing, you will
take
necessary
or
appropriate
action,
through
a
representative
designated by us, to recover payment
as damages
from
the
responsible
person or organization; if
there is
a
recovery,
then
we
shall
be
reimbursed out of
the
recovery for
expenses, costs
and attorney's fees
incurred
in connection
with
this
recovery.
You must
execute and
deliver to us
any
legal
instruments
or
papers
necessary
to secure the rights and
obligations
of
you
and
us
as
established here.

3.

4.

5.

The

provisions

Motorists.

on

page

On page 6

of

5
the

are both parts of Part IV, Uninsured
policy

(R.

526),

under

Part V-

General Provisions, there is the following paragraph:
5.

Our Recovery Rights (Subrogation)
In the event
of any payment under this
policy, we are entitled to all the rights
of recovery of the person to whom payment
was made against
another.
That person
must
sign
and
deliver
to us any legal
papers
relating
to that
recovery,
do
whatever
else
is necessary
to help us
exercise
those
rights
and
do
nothing
after loss to prejudice our rights.
When a person has been paid damages by us
under this policy and
also recovers from
another,
the
amount
recovered from the
other shall be held by
that
person in
trust for us and reimbursed to us to that
extent of our payment.

The question is, do the
various parts

of the

exclusions

and

rights

stated

in these

policy mean that Progressive has a right to

21

deduct from appellant's settlement with the clubs payments it made
to appellant under her car policy agreement?
In

the

case

of

the

uninsured

respondent's policy states, in Coverage 1
payment be

for bodily

imputes

to

The

policy

the

various

paragraphs the

quoted above,

or driving

must

be

of the

interpreted

exclusions

that the

and

uninsured motor
in a manner which

the

trust

and

right

definitions of the specific coverages for which an

insured receives benefits.
General

benefits,

injury "caused by accident and arising out

of the ownership, maintenance
vehicle."

motorist

Provisions

is

The

in

subrogation

language

insurance policy if it is not tied to

set

forth

in the

too broad for an automobile
the specific

coverages set

forth in the coverage sections of the policy.
When a

problem arises as to the meaning of an insurance

policy, the courts apply the fundamental principle that when there
is

any

question

regarding

the

language

language should be construed against

the

of

the

party

policy,

who

the

drafted it.

Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah
1983); Handley v. Mutual
147 P.2d

319, 322

(1944).

clear whether its intent
benefits, to

Life Insurance

the specific

Co., 106

Utah 184, 192,

Progressive's policy does not make it

is to

tie its

caveats, as

coverages within

it.

well as its

Seal v. Tayco,

Inc., 400 P.2d 503 (Utah 1965), addressed the problem of differing
language in separate portions of contract as follows:
In addressing this problem, certain principles
should be kept in mind. The first is that in
case of uncertainty as to the meaning of the
contract, it should be construed most strictly
22

against its framer . . . .
A particularized
application of this well-recognized doctrine
is that it seems manifestly unfair to permit
one who formulates a contract to so fashion it
as to mislead the other party by setting forth
a clearly apparent promise or representation
in order
to induce acceptance, and then
designedly
"burying"
elsewhere
in
the
document, in fine print, provisions which
purport to limit or take away the promise,
and/or
preclude
recovery for failure to
fulfill it.
Supplemental to
and in
accord with the
foregoing is the principle that it is improper
to excerpt from context and give independent
meaning to the provision
. . . .
It must be
considered in connection
with
the whole
contract . . . .
400 P.2d at 505.
It

is

not

clear

whether

Progressive
apply

to

policy

recoveries its

achieve due to the tortious conduct

of others.

Arguably, such a construction is far too

since

policy

the

is

not

clear,

it

any

the

subrogation provisions of its
insured might

to

meant

and all

broad.

But,

must be construed against

Progressive because Progressive drafted it.
Even if
provisions

the

consistent

policy
with

were
the

have

insured.

v. Continental

Court

construed

incapable
required by

of

similar,

reducing
the Utah

subrogation

but

and

the subrogation

other provisions in the policy,

Progressive would not
In Thamert

clear,

rights

against

its own

Cas. Co., supra, p. ]J^, the

clear,

contract

provisions

as

the mandatory uninsured motorist coverage
No-Fault Statute.

621

P.2d at

Thamert court would not permit an "offset by contract."

704.

The

To permit

a release of funds appellant received from tort-feasors other than
23

Scholtz,

based

"ownership,
vehicle,"
insured

on

liability

maintenance
would

be

herself

provision.

or

to

and

did

driving

defeat

the

It would

which

of

the

purpose

allow the

not
the

arise

out

uninsured

of

motor

purpose for which appellant
of

the

No-Fault

Insurance

type of reduction Thamert itself

would not permit•
B.

PIP Benefits and Collision Coverage

The

reasoning

claims regarding
benefits.

benefits were

for injury

inflicted by

policy

which

motorist.

appellant

imposed

appellant

against

Progressive's

benefits also applies to PIP

paid, without

regard to fault,

the uninsured motorist, Scholtz, under a
availed

Settlement amounts

statutorily
benefits

militates

uninsured motorist

The PIP

of

which

dram

as

a

liability

herself

do

to

not

of

damages

from

one

other

included in the subrogation and trust
in Allstate

v. Ivie,

reflect

receive.

Progressive's policy were not unclear as to whether
recovery

responsible

paid to appellant by the clubs for

shop

insured

herself

than

Even

any
if

the insured's

a motorist is to be

clauses, the

law as stated

supra, denies an insurer subrogation rights

vis-a-vi its insured as

to

recovery

in

a

settlement

or legal

action.
Like
coverage is a
unclear as
than a

uninsured
matter

contract.

and

PIP

benefits, collision

Progressive's

contract is

to reimbursement from recovery received from one other

motorist

recovery of

of

motorist

tort-feasor.

As

with

PIP

benefits, double-

collision coverage is not contemplated under the law,
24

nor would

appellant

however, was

not a

double-recovery.
contracted and

seek

it.

Her

recovery

complete recovery
Progressive's

from

the clubs,

and cannot be construed as

coverage,

for

which appellant

paid, should not become an instrument by which the

recovery she achieved is depleted.
POINT III
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES APPLY TO SUBROGATION, AND
SUBROGATION IS NOT PERMITTED IF IT WILL WORK
INJUSTICE TO OTHERS, WHICH WOULD BE THE CASE
IF AN INSURER WERE ALLOWED TO RECOVER ANY
PORTION OF AN INSURED'S RECOVERY FROM A TORTFEASOR BEFORE THE INSURED WERE MADE WHOLE.
Progressive

claims

a

right of subrogation against the

appellant because her settlements with the
agreements covering

f,

all claims" she had against the clubs.

argument is identical to
Transamerica
1972).

clubs entailed release

Insurance

the

argument

Company

v.

made

Barnes,

by
505

the

insurer in

P.2d 783 (Utah

The Court's response in Transamerica was:
Equitable principles apply to subrogation, and
the insured is entitled to be made whole
before the insurer may recover any portion of
the recovery from the tortfeasor. The purpose
of subrogation, as a creation of equity, is to
effect an adjustment between parties so as to
secure ultimately the payment or discharge of
a debt by a person who in good conscience
ought to pay for it.

[Transamerica] to establish a superior equity
and thus to be entitled to prevail must
present proof which establishes
that the
damages covered by defendant's settlement were
the same or cover
those for
which the
[insured] has already received indemnity from
[Transamerica]; otherwise,
the receipt of
payment from the tort-feasor does not entitle
25

This

[Transamerica] to
made by it.
505 P.2d at 786,
proof

to

787.

establish

In this
that

the

settlements were the same
paid.

or

of the payments

case, respondent
damages

cover

covered

those

for

interest

of

Settlements are

by

present

appellant's

which

respondent

time,

effort,

compromises parties

and economics.

settlement ever makes a plaintiff entirely
the

cannot

The facts reveal that the appellant has not been made whole

by the settlements.
the

the return

fact

that

appellant

received

a

Necessarily, no

whole.

In this case,

judgment

against

underlines the reality respondent seeks to obscure:
has not

been made

whole nor

is it

make in

likely that

Scholtz

the appellant
she will be, as

Scholtz is an unemployed laborer who has no assets.
Transamerica
rejecting

Progressive's

appellant's recovery.
litigated
insured.

presents

and

further

asserted

right

Transamerica

negotiated

his

to

justification

for

a

the

portion

waited until

of

the insured had

case to settlement, then sued its

The Court stated,
Furthermore,
if
[Transamerica]
had
an
opportunity
to assert its subrogation rights
to the
tort-feasors
and
neglected
to give
notice
or enforce
its
demands,
the
trial
court may determine
under
such circumstances
that
[Transamerica's]
rights
in equity are
equal or inferior
to
[the
insured's], i.e.,
equity
will
not
relieve
one who could have
relieved himself.

505 P.2d at 787.
negotiated

to

Progressive waited until appellant litigated and
settlement

her

case

attempting to intervene to enforce its
relieve it in this case.
26

against
demands.

the

clubs

before

Equity will not

CONCLUSION
Under the
this

case

as

release of

set

funds

respectfully

law, equitable
forth
granted

requests

from

principles, and

above,

respondent had no right to the

it

the

by
this

Court

trial

court.

distributed

to

appellant

as

Appellant

a reversal of the order

below releasing funds to Progressive and a holding
be

the facts of

rightfully

that the funds

included

compromise settlement with the two private club defendants
DATED

this J^^
___
y_

of

April, 1988.

BLACK & MOORE

MOSELEY

PH E. TESCH
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her
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the

I

day of

ADDENDUM NO. 1
Section 31A-22-302, U.C.A.

31A-22-302

INSURANCE CODE

(4) "Occupying" means being in or on a motor vehicle as a passenger or
operator, or being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding, or
alighting from a motor vehicle.
(5) "Operator" has the same meaning as under Subsection
41-12a-103(7).
(6) "Owner" has the same meaning as under Subsection 41-12a-103(8).
(7) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying a motor vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-301, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 155;
1987, ch. 91, § 49.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment,
in
Subsection
(1),
substituted

,f

41-12a-103(4)" for "41-12a-104", in Subsection
(5), substituted "41-12a-103(7)" for M41-12a104", and in Subsection (6), substituted
"41-12a-103(8)" for "41-12a-104 "

31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies — Exceptions,
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under §§ 31A-22-303 and
31A-22-304; and
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-3Q5, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a-301, except for
motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection under §§ 31A-22-306 t r o u g h 31A-22-30P.
(3) First party medical cov^ages may be offered or included in policies
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. These
owners and operators are not covered by personal injury protection coverages
in connection with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, m Subsection (2), inserted "trailers, and
semitrailers", designated the second and third
sentences in former Subsection (2) as Subsec-

tion (3), and, in Subsection (3), in the first sentence inserted "trailer, and semitrailer" and in
the second sentence substituted "These" for
"Motorcycle" and "any of these vehicles" for "a
motorcycle "

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehides operated by permissive users, under for-

mer law See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712
P 2d 224 (Utah 1985)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Injury or death caused by assault
as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle
insurance, 44 A.L R.4th 1010
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES

31A-22-305

31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage,
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehicle in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591.
Automobile liability insurance policy flight

from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49
A.L.R.4th 325.

31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehides operated by permissive users, under for-

mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent or child of accident victim as within extended "per accident" rather than "per person"

31A-22-305,

coverage of automobile liability policy, 46
A.L.R.4th 735.

Uninsured motorist coverage,

(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or
owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or if
the vehicle is covered, but with lower limits than required by
§ 31A-22-304, then the motor vehicle is uninsured to the extent of the
deficiency;
(b) an unidentified motor vehicle which left the scene of an accident
proximately caused by its operator; or
(c) an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability
insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, but the motor vehicle is uninsured only to the extent that the
claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association
or fund.
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 3~ A-22-302(l)(b) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death, in limits which at least equal the minimum bodily
Jinjury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under § 31A-22-304.
JUS
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
by insured while occupying "owned" vehicle
not insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute

31A-22-306.

31A-22-307

establishing compensation for claims not
paid because of insurer's insolvency, 30
A.L.R.4th 1110.

Personal injury protection.

Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the
coverages and benefits described under § 31A-22-307 to persons described
under § 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in § 31A-22-309.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 158.

ment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted
"31A-22-302(2)" for "31A-22-302(3)" and "in"
for "under."

Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance
§ 1689.
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no

fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) coverages in automobile liability policy or policies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12.
Key Numbers. — Insurance <s=> 11.1.

31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and
benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and br-nefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic devices),
ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of
$3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income
and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless
the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks
after the date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that
this benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date
of injury unless the person's inability to perform these services
continues for more thar. two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of
$1,500 per person; and
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(d) compensation on account of death of a person payable to his
heirs, m the total of $3,000
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided
for m Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall, at least once each odd-numbered year, conduct a relative value
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or
rehabilitation of an injured person m the most populous county m the state
to assign a unit value and median charge to each type of service and accommodation In conducting the study, the department shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health agencies Upon completion
of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value
study which sets forth the unit value and median charge assigned to each
type of service and accommodation. The value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the unit value and median charge assigned
to the service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service
or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or median charge under the
relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal
the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation m the
most populous county of this state. This subsection does not preclude the
department from adopting a schedule already established or a schedule
prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the requirements o**
i^iis subsection In " ^puted cases, a court on its own motion or on the
motion of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on
the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical expenses
(3) Medical expenses as provided for m Subsection (l)(a) and m Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care
and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method
of healing.
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates, insurers may offer deductibles m amounts not exceeding $500 per accident with respect to the insurance coverages required under this section However, the deductible is applicable only to claims of the named insured and persons living m his
household
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under
this chapter nor does it require the segregation of thof e minimum coverages from other coverages m the same policy.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 159.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
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ment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted "prosthetic devices" in Subsection (l)(a), and made
minor stylistic changes throughout the section
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Section 31A-22-309

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
iting application of these provisions to accidents "in this state," insurance commissioner's regulation making no-fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents occur-

31A-22-309

ring outside the state was in error. IML
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah
1975).

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to
personal injury protection.
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy which includes personal injury protection may maintain a cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused
by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or
more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under
this part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under
the policy;
(ii) f^ any injury sustained by any person while operating ' lie
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of
the insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor
vehicle; or
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to
his injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions
which may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under § 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered in this code under any workers'
compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives (r is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active
duty in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other
policy, including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage
is given by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
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(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in § 31A-22-307 shall be made
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after
that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the
claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid
within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails
to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate
of 1V2% per month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits
may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable
interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits
and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee
to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage shall provide:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to
whom benefits required under personal injury protection have been
paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, the insurer of the ™.rson who would br ^eld legally liable shall
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 160.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in the introductory language of Subsection (1), substituted
"person has sustained" for "accident caused";
in Subsection (l)(b) deleted "or fracture" at
the end; substituted "$3,000" for "$1,000" in
Subsection (l)(e); in Subsection (2), redesig-

^Q

nated the subsections, rewrote the introductory language in Subsection (2)(a), and added
Subsection (2)(b); in Subsection (6)(a), substituted "Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
the insurer of the person who would be held
legally liable shall" for "State Insurance
Fund, it will"; and made minor stylistic
changes throughout the section.
Meaning of "this code". — See note under same catchline following § 31A-22-102.

